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more skill-intensive during these three decades. The exogenous shock of World War I dramatically
raised the price of Chinese exports, increased the demand for Chinese goods overseas, and increased
the demand for unskilled workers producing these goods. These trends continued even after the war
ended. We show that the timing of the rise in export prices is consistent with the observed decline
in the skill premium in China. The skill-unskilled wage ratio flattened out during the 1910s and then
fell by eight percent during the 1920s. We simulate the price shock of World War I using a general
equilibrium factor-endowments model of trade and find evidence consistent with the observed fall
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One of the most contentious issues with respect to the global growth in trade is its effects on 
wages. Much of the debate has focused on how the expansion in trade between developing and developed 
countries affects the wages in the United States and Europe. The logic of trade theories such as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model and Stolper-Samuelson suggest that an expansion of trade will raise the 
wages of skilled workers and lower those of unskilled workers in developed countries if they are 
relatively well endowed with skilled labor. This has led some commentators to link the growing wage 
inequality within the U.S. to trade with the rest of world; even more specifically, some have suggested 
that as U.S. trade with China grows, wages for unskilled workers in the U.S. will fall in response.  
An equally interesting question is how the global trade boom has altered wages in developing 
countries. For example, factor endowments also predict that the skill premium should be falling in rapidly 
developing countries like China where the stock of unskilled workers is large relative to developing 
countries. Using city-level data, Wei and Wu (2001) find evidence that inequality has fallen within China, 
and that the decline in rural-urban inequality have been most pronounced in areas that increased their 
openness (trade-GDP ratios). On the other hand, other empirical studies suggest that globalization has 
likely increased inequality in developing countries in the last three decades, although these findings 
depend on country-specific and time-specific factors.
1 For example, Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007) present 
evidence that increased FDI and trade have widened inequality within China more recently. 
Determining the impact of the current trade boom on wages in developing and developed 
countries is complicated since trade has become more complicated than what is typically described in 
factor endowments models, whose origins are at least 90 years old. Intra-industry trade, outsourcing, 
offshoring, and multinationals complicate the testing of their theoretical predictions. More generally, 
                                                           
1 For a survey, see Goldberg and Pacvcnik (2007). For articles on the effects of trade on skill premia in specific 
countries see, for example, Robbins (1996), Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara (1999), Gasparini (2003), Hanson (2004), 
and Robertson (2000, 2004). 
  1confounding influences make the task of causal inference extremely challenging for studies examining 
current trade flows. For example, in thinking about the impact of expanding trade on the wage premium 
in developed countries today, empirical researchers may also need to account for declining union power, 
falling minimum wages, increased rates of immigration of unskilled workers, and greater skill-biased 
technological change. Similarly, analyses that focus on the impact of trade on wages in developing 
countries, like China, also face an array of challenging empirical issues that make identification difficult, 
including assessing the impacts of technological change, foreign direct investment, and state intervention 
on factor prices.  
A number of scholars have suggested that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may be 
better periods for testing the empirical predictions of factor endowments models. Estevadeordal and 
Taylor (2002) argue that low barriers to trade (especially in simple manufactured goods and agriculture), 
more skewed factor endowments, less trade in differentiated products and services, and minimal intra-
industry trade are some characteristics of the first era of globalization that may make it a good laboratory 
for testing this class of models. O’Rourke and Williamson (1994, 1996, 1999) have provided empirical 
evidence of factor price convergence and other predictions of these models during the great expansion of 
trade in the late nineteenth century.  
In this paper, we use the lens of history to better understand how a rapid expansion in trade 
affects the skill premium for a developing country. In particular, we ask how the skill premium in China 
responded to an earlier era of globalization and explosive growth in trade. We assemble new data on 
Chinese trade and wages for the period from 1903 to 1928 and use the exogenous shock of World War I 
to shed light on this question.  
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, China experienced a tremendous growth 
in trade with the rest of the world. The nominal value of exports sextupled and imports rose roughly by 
the same amount (Figure 1). Although China had been forcibly opened to trade in the 1840s, the scale of 
trade was quite small until the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed and an era of conflict with foreign 
powers concluded with Chinese supplication in the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901). The beginning of our 
  2sample period hence corresponds to a period of less conflict with foreign powers and China’s entry into 
the global trade boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like the current period of 
globalization, China’s economy dramatically opened up to world trade: total trade as a share of GDP 
almost tripled during our sample period, an increase that is roughly comparable what China has 
experienced since 1978. With respect to the effects that trade had on wages, the most important change 
may have occurred in response to World War I – an event that altered global trade patterns and had 
lasting effects on Chinese trade. We show that the price of Chinese exports rose, leading to a surge in 
Chinese exports. Wages and employment rose for unskilled workers, which were utilized intensively in 
the production of Chinese exports. 
We marshal new data on the factor content of Chinese trade to show that China’s export boom in 
the first three decades was characterized by a rapid expansion in the production and sale of unskilled-
intensive products to the rest of the world. In the second decade of the twentieth century, China’s growth 
in exports of unskilled-intensive manufactures, mining, and agricultural products received an additional 
boost in demand from World War I. Whereas the war disrupted trade in many other parts of the world, it 
caused an expansion in Chinese exports, creating new markets for Chinese goods that had previously been 
served by producers in belligerent countries.  
Employing unit value data from Chinese trade statistics, we show that the prices of key exports 
rose rapidly in response to the exogenous shock of World War I and continued to rise even after hostilities 
ended. Exports continued their upward trajectory as China’s products were integrated into the global trade 
network.  
Using new data on wages for unskilled and skilled workers, we argue that the growth in Chinese 
trade and the price shock of World War I largely account for the flattening out of the skill premium in the 
1910s and the subsequent 8 percent fall in the skill premium between 1920 and 1928 (Figure 2). We 
develop a general equilibrium model of trade (based on factor endowments) and show how a price shock 
affects the skill premium. We then simulate the model and compare the results to the observed data on 
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shock is taken into account.  
In the next section, we provide some historical background on the growth in Chinese trade during 
the first three decades of the twentieth century. Section III describes how we employ the theoretical 
predictions from factor endowments models to conduct a factor content analysis of Chinese trade. Section 
IV describes our new trade database assembled from the publications of the Chinese Maritime Customs 
Service and our methodology for estimating the factor content of trade. Section V assesses the 
relationship between factor content and export growth, calculates the change in export prices, and relates 
our trade data to changes in the skill premium in China during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century. Section VI presents a general equilibrium model of trade, simulates a price shock, and compares 
the results from the model to observed changes in the skill premium. The final section discusses the 
implications of our findings and concludes.  
 
II. China’s First Twentieth-Century Trade Boom 
The first three decades of the twentieth century mark the period when China’s trade with the rest 
of the world expanded significantly. Until the 1840s, China was largely a closed, agrarian economy; 
however, pressure from Great Britain and other foreign powers led China to open its economy to 
international trade. The 1842 Treaty of Nanking permitted foreigners to trade with the Chinese in five 
ports and stipulated a general five percent ad valorem tariff on almost all goods leaving and entering 
China. Over the subsequent sixty years, China saw a gradual opening up of trade as China signed treaties 
with foreign powers and additional ports were allowed to transact with foreigners.
2   
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 ushered in further changes to Chinese trade and 
production. The Treaty of Shimonoseki allowed Japanese businesses to invest directly in China and 
produce goods and services that could be sold abroad as well as within China. Soon after the treaty was 
                                                           
2 During this period, the largest import commodities were opium, cotton textiles, and petroleum products (kerosene, 
gasoline, etc.). Major exports were tea and silk. 
  4signed, this privilege was extended to other foreign nations via most-favored-nation agreements. Foreign 
capital financed railroad, telecommunications, and shipping enterprises and spurred industrialization.  
By the early twentieth century, the number of cities open to trade had climbed to 48 cities. As 
ports opened up and foreigners were allowed to invest and trade, China transitioned from a closed to an 
open economy. With no notable trade policy restrictions in place, China then experienced a sustained 
growth in international trade (Figure 1). Cheng (1956) estimates that between 1900 and 1913 the total 
value of trade grew twice as much as it had between 1868 and 1900. In the first 13 years of the twentieth 
century, the value of foreign exports nearly tripled, imports almost quadrupled, and the annual growth rate 
of trade averaged 7.4 percent. China’s trade growth was faster than the world average in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century: its share of world trade increased from 1.5 percent around 1898 to 3.44 
percent by 1928.  By the early twentieth century, the Chinese economy was exploiting its comparative 
advantage in unskilled manufactures. Indicative of this growth was trade in cotton textiles, which became 
one of the fastest growing industries over the subsequent decades. 
As we emphasize throughout this paper, World War I had transformative effects on the Chinese 
economy. It disrupted trade in other parts of the world and redirected it in the ways that directly benefited 
China, including a large increase in demand for its exports. Although China did not experience a dramatic 
acceleration in the growth rate of exports during World War I, this fact disguises several important effects 
the war had on Chinese exports and wages. Many countries experienced a contraction in trade during 
World War I (Glick and Taylor, 2001). Trade growth for China, on the other hand, was superior to the 
average country during this period. Imports were disrupted throughout World War I, but exports were 
only temporarily affected. After declining for one year, exports resumed their upward trajectory. Even 
during the war, they continued to grow at trend rather than below trend (Figure 1). In the ten years from 
1917 to 1927, they grew at 7 percent annually. Just as important, the price of its exports began to rise 
during the war and continued an upward trajectory through the 1920s. Chinese exports to countries like 
the United States and Japan increased rapidly. The war redirected trade between other countries to China, 
and allowed it to expand production and further specialize according to comparative advantage. Most of 
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edible oils) received a considerable boost from World War I; moreover, demand from the rest of the 
world did not subside after the war ended (see Table 1). For example, trade records indicate that domestic 
yarn firms (cotton textiles) started to export in 1913, and by the mid 1920s, had largely displaced imports 
(Figure 3). Bristle (one of China’s top 10 exports) was used to make brushes for machines, guns, and 
cannons; by 1930, China was supplying 90% of the world’s bristle (You, 1990). Another top 10 export, 
edible oil, also received a considerable boost from World War I. After the outbreak of war, the oil-
pressing industry in Europe, switched to the production of military-related products, leaving a huge gap in 
demand for edible oil in these countries. China filled this gap by dramatically increasing its exports to 
European belligerent countries. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
To formulate testable predictions of the effects of this trade boom on wages and (in Section VI) 
simulate the effects of a price shock on Chinese trade, we draw on insights from factor endowments 
models of trade. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model predicts that when an economy that is 
relatively well endowed with unskilled labor opens up to foreign trade, it will specialize in producing 
unskilled labor intensive products for export. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (SS), an 
increase in export prices will lead to an expansion in trade expands, and wages for unskilled workers will 
rise relative to those of skilled workers. Although HOV models and their related theorems often abstract 
from reality in their parsimony (two countries, two goods, two factors) and in their theoretical 
assumptions (constant returns to scale, perfect competition, identical production technologies, free 
mobility of goods, etc.), they are nevertheless useful for framing how trade based on comparative 
advantage affects factor prices within countries and for drawing attention to the winners and losers in 
trade. For example, policymakers have used the simple predictions of the 2x2x2 version of the models 
and the Stolper Samueson theorem to explain how increased trade and globalization is impacting wages. 
They also have been used by economists to consider the extent to which trade is driving increased wage 
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predicting the consequences that China’s expanding bilateral trade with the U.S. will have on U.S. wages 
(Krugman, 2008; Lawrence, 2008).  
Despite their theoretical elegance, testing the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is 
challenging.
3 Empirical researchers often restrict their attention to simple versions of factor content 
models so that they retain clearer theoretical predictions and avoid issues such as factor substitutability. 
There are nevertheless identification issues that make estimating the effects of trade on wages using 
modern data extremely challenging. Skill premiums today may be driven by a variety of factors that are 
difficult to disentangle, including technology, migration, and institutional changes in labor markets.  
On the other hand, there are several reasons why factor endowments models may have more 
power in explaining the effect that trade has on wages in historical periods including our study of China 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century.
4 First, bulky standardized commodities, such as 
wheat and meat, and simple manufactures, like cotton goods, were the basis for the global growth in trade 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2003). In contrast to the 
differentiated trade in goods and services today, differences in factor endowments may be sufficient for 
explaining the movement of raw materials and simple manufactures across national boarders (i.e., it may 
be unnecessary to appeal to newer trade models emphasizing product differentiation or the within-
industry effects, such as Melitz (2003)). Second, there were fewer tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, 
especially with respect to agricultural goods and low-skilled manufactured goods – two important areas of 
export for China during our sample period (Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2002).
5  
                                                           
3 An exception in the historical literature is O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson (1996), which examines the 
relationship between commodity and factor price convergence across a panel of eleven countries. 
4 For a review of factors driving skill premium today in developing countries, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). As 
noted here, there are likely large differences in how trade operated in the earlier period of globalization in 
comparison to today. 
5 Much of the literature on the recent period of globalization has used evidence from changes in trade policy (i.e., 
tariff liberalization) to understand the impact of trade on wage inequality; however, since trade policy is the outcome 
of politics, it is an endogenous variable. Several recent studies have exploited additional cross-sectional (industry) 
and time variation in the data in order to deal with issues of causality (Hanson, 2007; Wei and Wu, 2001; Topalova, 
2004; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005.) In this paper, we exploit an alternative source of exogenous variation to 
identify the impact of trade on wages – World War I – which we argue is an exogenous shock for Chinese trade. 
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premia, like China’s, during the first global trade boom. In contrast to today, when we observe a 
considerable amount of skill-biased technological change, technological innovations in China in this 
earlier era were more of a complement to than a substitute for unskilled workers in the production 
process.
6 For example, in a fast-growing Chinese export sector like cotton textiles, the introduction of 
new machinery (ring spinning), which improved labor productivity, did not displace the demand for 
unskilled labor in this industry (Zhao and Chen, 1997).
7 By contrast, the use of primarily uneducated 
females grew rapidly in this industry. Government estimates suggest that, between 1912 and 1920, 
employment in cotton textiles in China grew by 32%, from 228,497 to 301,544, almost all of which was 
an expansion in unskilled labor (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 1928, pp. 9-11). We would be 
the first to acknowledge that if technological change is complementary to unskilled labor, then some of 
the observed decline in the skill premium may be due to changes in technology.
8 It should be emphasized, 
however, that the vast majority of China’s exports during the first three decades (in particular, agriculture, 
handicraft industries, and mining) experienced little technological progress during our sample period 
(Wang, 1998; Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984). For example, bristle, one of the leading exports in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, was a typical labor-intensive handicraft; most workers employed 
in its production were uneducated and from low-income peasant families (You, 1990). Many of the other 
leading exports in our sample were agricultural and mining products, and the production of these products 
was unskilled intensive. It thus seems unlikely that technological change was the principal force that 
                                                           
6 They were often embodied in machines that could be imported from other countries. Indeed, this may have been 
the motivation for H-O to assume that the same technology existed for two countries in their model of trade. Since 
transport costs fell dramatically during the era in which they wrote (and during part of our sample period), it would 
have seemed unrealistic to assume that countries couldn’t simply have imported technology (embodied in machines) 
from other countries (Feenstra and Taylor, 2008).  
7 Chinese cotton textile factories imported ring-spinning technology from more industrialized countries, which used 
unskilled labor more intensively than the older technology of mule spinning. The type of technology employed also 
depended on the quality of cotton used in production. (Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984, 1987). 
8 If skill-biased technological change is concentrated in low-skilled sectors, then it could generate a decline in the 
skill premium (Leamer, 1984), which would be indistinguishable from a fall in the skill premium induced by a trade 
shock. 
  8drove the precipitous decline in the skill premium. As a consequence, we will focus our attention on 
accounting for the effects arising from differences in factor endowments rather than technology. 
Fourth, the growth in the stock of educated workers in China during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century was likely too small to alter the skill premium significantly. Enrollment rates in 
secondary schools rose late in the period and the stock of these newly educated workers was likely too 
small to have much of an effect on the wages of skilled workers (Xiong, 1990). And as noted above, 
unlike today, there appears to have been no surge in demand for skilled workers during this earlier era of 
globalization so that skill complementarity is less likely to explain the movements in skill premium in 
China.
9  
Fifth, although workers departed Europe in large numbers and went to the Americas during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China’s participation in this wave of global migration was much 
smaller. Roughly ten million Chinese emigrated between 1840 and 1920, which would translate into an 
average of a little less than one hundred thousand per year (Ge, Cao, and Wu, 1993, pp.485-6). In relation 
to the total population of China, roughly 400 million during our sample period, the emigration would have 
had a negligible effect on wages in China. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the effects of 
emigration on the wages of unskilled workers during our sample period is likely much more muted than 
in developing countries today.  
Sixth, after 1894, foreign direct investment was permitted in China. Scholarship suggests that FDI 
may have served as a catalyst for China’s industrialization. It was most concentrated in the parts of the 
manufacturing industry that had a greater reliance on advanced machinery. Overall, the total increase in 
foreign capital flows during our sample period was small and the rate of growth in FDI was fairly steady 
throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century (Hou, 1965). It exhibits no break or surge 
around World War I. FDI’s effects on the skill premium are ambiguous: it may have increased the 
                                                           
9 This is a notable difference from what is observed in developing countries today, like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, and India, where the share of skilled workers within industries has increased 
dramatically over the past two decades (Robbins (1996), Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2003), Attanasio and 
Szekely (2000), Blom, Goldberg, Pavcnik and Schady (2004), Hsieh and Woo (2005), and Kijima (2006). 
  9demand for skilled workers as it has today or, as in the case of the role of technology in early-twentieth-
century China, been complementary to unskilled labor.
10  
Seventh, unlike today, when institutions such as unions and minimum or state wages can impact 
observed wage rates, there is no evidence that the Chinese labor market faced significant regulation; 
hence the skill premium was not likely influenced by labor market institutions during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. Finally, trade in intermediate products (i.e. outsourcing, offshoring, and 
“global product sharing”) was insignificant in the earlier era of globalization. 
 
IV. Data and Measurement of the Factor Content of Chinese Trade 
We now examine how the Chinese trade boom of the first three decades of the twentieth century 
affected the skill premium in China. Figure 2 shows that the skill premium rose during the first decade of 
the twentieth century (when trade expanded, but export prices were relatively constant), but then flattened 
out and declined as export prices rose and the export boom continued virtually uninterrupted until 1929. 
Although the time series graph is broadly consistent with the view that the rapid growth in trade may have 
impacted the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in China, we subject this hypothesis to more scrutiny 
by considering whether the factor content of Chinese trade is consistent with the predictions of factor 
endowments models. 
Factor endowment models in the spirit of HOV-SS predict that, as China opened up to trade with 
the rest of the world and received a boost when export prices rose (beginning around World War I), 
exports of goods that use relatively more unskilled labor (the abundant factor in China in comparison to 
skilled labor) in the production process will increase. The demand for unskilled labor will rise as the 
economy exports more. China will also begin to import more goods that are produced with relatively 
more skilled labor, thus reducing the domestic demand for skilled labor. As long as the supply curves for 
labor are not perfectly elastic, the shifts in demand for skilled and unskilled workers will cause the wages 
                                                           
10 Stolper-Samuelson effects assume that labor and capital are mobile within a country, but immobile across borders. 
However, if we allow for FDI, Rybczinski’s Theorem suggests no long-run impact on factor prices. 
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China’s trade boom will cause the skill premium to fall. 
 
A. Data 
To examine the factor content of Chinese trade, we assemble new detailed estimates of exports 
and imports at the industry level from China Maritime Customs’ (hereafter “CMC”) trade publications. 
CMC was likely the only bureaucratic organization in China that operated without interruption (due to 
wars or funding shortages) from 1858 to 1949. Although it reported to the Chinese government, its top 
administration as well as mid-level managers and technocrats were largely foreigners – initially British 
citizens, but later on also Japanese and Americans. CMC’s primary tasks were collecting customs revenue 
and recording and publishing data on foreign trade; however, it eventually expanded its operations to 
include collecting revenues from domestic trade, administering the postal system, developing inland and 
coastal waterways, and representing China at international fairs. CMC’s geographical reach grew from 
just fourteen stations in the 1860s to nearly fifty during the 1920s, covering not only the coastal regions 
but also inland cities.  
CMC published 160 volumes of detailed trade statistics, which span roughly 90 years of 
commercial transactions (1858-1949). We collected our new trade database using these publications, 
which are located in archives in Nanjing. CMC collected its data at the port level. Their records included 
information on the quantities and the values of all commodities passing through each treaty port. When 
aggregated, they also provide a detailed picture of China’s trade with the rest of the world. In comparison 
to other economic or demographic data on China during this period, the quality and detail of the CMC 
trade data is exceptional and rivals the trade publications of the advanced nations of the late nineteenth 
century.
11 
                                                           
11 Trade statistics report types and destinations of trade, so that we are able to ensure that trade is not double counted. 
Values of export are F.O.B and values of imports are C.I.F.  
  11Since CMC trade statistics were primarily published at the port level, the units of measurement 
and currency sometimes varied across ports and over time. We therefore standardized the measurement 
and currency units and then aggregated the product-level data to the national level. 
 
B. Measurement 
To assess the influence of the expansion in trade on the skill premium in China, we examine the 
factor content of Chinese exports. We keep our factor content analysis simple and consider differences in 
production based only on labor characteristics – whether workers were skilled or unskilled. Although this 
is clearly a simplification, it enables us to take advantage of our detailed trade data and new estimates of 
Chinese wages from Yan (2008) to further our understanding of the effects of trade and openness during a 
period of Chinese history when little information on other firm or industry characteristics exists. 
After creating a database of quantities and values of all the traded commodities using the CMC 
trade publications, we classified exports and imports based on economic activity and skill intensity. To do 
this, we first selected a standard classification system so that we could systemize the aggregates of 
economic activity and measure factor content by “industry group.” This is especially important because 
our database covers Chinese trade for all the treaty ports over three decades, the nomenclature of traded 
goods sometimes changed, and the individual customhouses sometimes collected trade statistics using 
their own naming systems.  
Since the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) was not adopted in major industrial 
surveys or censuses, it has limited usefulness for the wide variety of commodities in our Chinese trade 
data. Instead, we use the Index of Occupations and Industries from the 1950 U.S. Census of Population 
(“IND1950”). The basic content of the occupational and industrial classification was largely derived from 
earlier censuses, in particular, the 1940 Census. Since IND1950 is somewhat retrospective in design, it 
provides a consistent set of industry codes that is broad enough to capture the trade being conducted by 
China between 1903 and 1928. 
  12Next, we classified industries according to skill intensity. Since there is no agreed upon 
methodology for determining the factor content of products or industries, empirical studies use a variety 
of approaches to proxy factor content. One approach is to rank industries according to average wages. If 
workers are paid their marginal products (as would prevail in competitive markets for factors and goods), 
then, on average, higher paying industries ought to reflect higher average productivity or skill. Another 
way to proxy for skill intensity is to rank industries by average education levels. A third approach is to 
calculate the share of production workers (relative to non-production workers) in each industry.    
Because U.S. historical census data provides broad industry coverage and detailed information on 
education and wages, our starting point for classifying skill intensity for Chinese industries was to create 
benchmarks based on the 1940 U.S. Census.
12 In particular, the 1940 U.S. Census is the first census that 
provided information on an individual’s education and earnings. The 1940 Census records each 
individual’s highest level of educational attainment, ranging from no education to five or more years of 
post-secondary education. In our analysis, we classify workers with nine or more years of education as 
skilled workers. We count the numbers of skilled and unskilled employees in the 1940 Census for each 
industry (using the IND1950 classification described above) and then calculate the fraction of workers in 
each industry that had nine or more years of education.  
The 1940 Census also records each individual’s annual wage, allowing us to aggregate these data 
and obtain average industry wages (again based on IND1950 industry classification). Hence, using U.S. 
Census data, we are able to obtain information on skill intensity at the industry level based on (1) 
education and (2) wages. We report industry rankings using these two metrics in Tables 2 and 3. The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the two metrics is 0.75, and is significantly different from 0 at 
conventional levels of significance. 
                                                           
12 Benchmarking on the U.S. historical census relies on several strong assumptions, such as the existence of the 
same technologies in the U.S. and China, the same skill intensities of these technologies in the two countries, and the 
same productivity of factors used in production. As Helpman (1999), Maskus and Nishioka (2008), Davis and 
Mishra (2007) and others point out, these assumptions might not hold in the real world. However, Chinese industries 
in that period mostly adopted new technologies from leading industrial countries such as the U.S. Therefore, 
technologies and their factor contents were similar in these two countries. As a robustness check, later in the paper, 
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V. Analyzing the Effects of the Chinese Trade Boom on Wages 
 
A. Factor Content Analysis 
 A first test in the spirit of factor endowments models is to examine whether total exports were 
becoming more unskilled-intensive in their composition over the course of our sample period. Using the 
data on industry averages for wages and education, we classify the industrial sectors into two broad 
groups, unskilled and skilled. We denote industries where the fraction of workers with nine or more years 
of education exceeded 0.48 as skilled industries. We divide the data at this value since the two industries 
above and below this cutoff seemed most dissimilar in terms of labor force characteristics (motor vehicles 
and motor vehicle equipment versus glass and glass products). In a similar way, we also divided the 
industry data into skilled and unskilled using log wages. Industries with log wage values greater than 
2.986 are classified as skilled, which puts metal mining and pottery producing as the two industries on the 
dividing line.
13 Figures 4 and 5 display the composition of exports and imports in terms of factor content. 
In 1903, when the magnitude of foreign trade was fairly small and China was relatively closed, most of its 
imports and exports were composed of unskilled-intensive products. However, as Chinese trade grew in 
importance over the next 25 years, we see significant movements in the ratios for both exports and 
imports. Using either wages or education as our measure of skill, exports became more unskilled-
intensive over the entire sample period – rising from about 0.92 to 0.99 for the education ratio and from 
roughly 0.8 to roughly 0.9 for the wage ratio (Figure 4). In contrast, the share of unskilled imports 
declines substantially. Using the measure based on education, the share of unskilled exports falls form 
0.88 to 0.75 (Figure 4, Panel A). In the same vein, the fraction of imports that are skill-intensive increases 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we consider an alternative measure of skill intensity at the industry level, based on a more limited Chinese survey of 
manufacturing. 
 
13 The results reported later in the paper do not appear that sensitive to changing these cutoffs. 
  14from 0.11 to 0.25 over the sample period (Figure 5). The trend towards more unskilled intensive exports 
and more skill-intensive imports is particularly pronounced after 1913. 
Another way of assessing the general factor content of trade is to examine the detailed industry 
data. In Figures 6-9, we display the value of exports and imports for each industry on the y-axis and its 
corresponding skill intensity on the x-axis for four years: 1903, 1913, 1919, and 1928. Skill intensity 
increases as we move in a rightward direction along the x-axis. We present this evidence for skill intensity 
based on education (Panel A of Figures 6-9) and log wages (Panel B of Figures 6-9). The figures show 
that exports are largely clustered at the lower levels of skill intensity whereas imports dominate the 
highest values of skill intensity.  These characteristics of the figures are even more evident by 1928. 
These results constitute strong evidence that trade was fundamentally responding in ways that are 
consistent with factor endowments models of trade. Even if we found no evidence that the unskilled-
intensive exports were rising over our sample period, the factor content data could still be consistent with 
the predictions of factor endowments models if it were true that, overall, Chinese exports grew faster for 
unskilled-intensive industries than for skill-intensive industries. This would indicate that the expansion in 
exports shown in Figure 1 was driven by unskilled-intensive exports. (Similarly, skill-intensive imports 
should grow faster than those for unskilled industries.) 
To test this alternative prediction, we divide the data into ten industry groups based on skill 
intensity and then compute the growth rates for each decile. Tracking the growth in exports of individual 
industries might be preferable, but it is complicated by the fact that some industries lack data for our 
whole sample period. Using industry groupings allows us to examine industries of similar skill intensity 
and follow them over the entire sample period. We weight the deciles by their share of the total value of 
exports, and then plot the growth rate of exports for each group relative to its skill intensity.   
Figures 10-11 graph the average annual growth rates for exports and imports from 1903 to 1928 
where industry groups are ordered by skill intensity (using either the wage or education classifications as 
indicated on the graph). The figures show that the fastest growing deciles for exports tended to be those 
with the lowest skill intensity. Indeed, since such a large preponderance of exports use unskilled labor 
  15intensively, the visual impact of the graph is diminished since there is no way to include all the zero 
values of industries (not exported) that would be more skill intensive. On the other hand, the fastest 
growing deciles for imports tended to be the most skill intensive. 
 
B. Robustness Check 
In our empirical analysis, we have implicitly drawn on an assumption of the HOV model – that 
technology is the same across countries – so that we could derive skill intensities for Chinese industries 
using 1940 U.S. census benchmarks. However, because the assumption of common technology may not 
have held in practice and because our U.S. skill-intensity benchmarks are based on data from 1940, we 
explore whether the factor content analysis is robust to an alternative classification scheme. To carry out 
our robustness check, it is necessary to identify an alternative survey for deriving skill intensity at the 
industry level. Unfortunately, survey data at the individual, occupational, or industry level for China 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century are very scarce.  
The 1928 Shanghai Census is the earliest survey that contains information sufficient to derive 
estimates of skill intensity at the industry level. It was administered by the Bureau of Industry, 
Agriculture, and Commerce of the Greater Shanghai Municipality and included information on factory 
names and addresses, ownership, capitalization, number of workers, wages, raw materials, and power 
utilization. The survey records only the highest and lowest wage rates by industry rather than average 
industry wages. Rather than using the minimum and maximum wage data (which would likely produce 
unreliable estimates for computing factor intensity), we instead used information on inputs to compute the 
capital-labor ratio to evaluate skill intensity of industries. For these calculations, we assume that 
industries which use more labor are, on average, characterized by lower-skilled workers. We first 
classified the traded goods using the classification system adopted in the 1928 Shanghai Survey, and then 
calculated the capital-labor ratio by dividing the total physical capital (value of physical capital stock) by 
the number of workers in each industry. We then ranked the traded goods industries according to their 
capital-labor ratios (Table 4). 
  16Figures 12 and 13 show that, using the 1928 Shanghai survey produces results that are similar to 
those based on the U.S. skill-intensity benchmarks. Growth rates for Chinese exports were highest for 
unskilled industry deciles and growth rates for imports were highest for the skilled deciles.  
 
C. Evidence on the Price of Exports 
Factor endowment theories suggest that changes in product prices are the mechanism that alters 
trade flows and factor prices. Therefore, a necessary condition for trade to impact the skill premium is a 
change in the price of exports. We have thus far shown that China became more specialized in producing 
and exporting unskilled intensive commodities. Assuming the marginal product of workers has not 
changed, if export prices rise substantially, the skill premium in China will eventually fall, since Chinese 
exports use relatively more unskilled labor in their production. 
14 
Hsiao’s (1974) export price index shows that export prices grew markedly after 1913 (Figure 
14).
15 Consistent with other global studies of trade, prices of traded goods rose during World War I. 
Moreover, it appears that in China’s case, the positive shock in demand was large enough to significantly 
move prices upward after a decade of little change. After a brief cessation after the war, prices resumed 
their upward trajectory. During the period when the skill premium was flattening out and falling, export 
prices roughly doubled. Rising sales and prices led to growing revenue for exporting firms, providing 
                                                           
14 Ideally, we would prefer to use the terms of trade rather than just the price of exports. In arguing that wages will 
respond to changes in the terms of trade, a conventional factor endowments model assumes identical trade costs for 
exports and imports. However, for our Chinese data, this is not the case. The price of exports is F.O.B. and price of 
imports is C.I.F. The key difference between these two measures is that C.I.F. measure for imports includes 
transportation (freight) and insurance costs (Cheng, 1956; Hsiao, 1974). During World War I, freight costs and 
insurance rates rose dramatically. For example, Mohammed and Williamson (2004, p.180) show that a nominal 
freight rates index for a representative Asian trade route increased from 0.702 in 1914 to 14.874 by 1918 – an 
increase of more than 2000 percent. Using a global index, real freight rates roughly tripled during World War I, 
according to Mohammed and Williamson (2004, p.88). Hence, using C.I.F. import prices dramatically overstates the 
true price of imports, relative to our F.O.B. exports series. Using import prices would thus produce a biased terms of 
trade series that is much different from what theory suggests is appropriate for measuring the impact of trade on 
wages.  
15 The export prices shown in Figure 14 are the prices in silver. The export prices relative to the price of gold show 
similar qualitative results: the price increased by 28 percent from 1903 to 1913, but by 120 percent from 1914 to 
1919, and by 60 percent from 1914 to 1928. 
  17considerable scope for raising the wages of unskilled workers that were used intensively in their 
production.  
We used the unit value data contained in our database to compute the growth rates in prices for 
China’s ten most important exports (based on value). Figure 15 shows positive average annual growth 
rates in unit values for these major exports over the period 1903 to 1928. For nine of the ten chief exports, 
the growth rates were faster after 1914 (Panel B). In addition, the commodities shown in this figure that 
used unskilled labor more intensively (agricultural goods and cotton yarn) experienced particularly strong 
rates of growth in their prices. Figure 16 shows that prices in cotton yarn grew by 275 percent after 1913. 
Cotton spinning was widely considered a typical unskilled-intensive manufacturing industry. China had 
been a large importer of cotton yarn, but by the beginning in the twentieth century, a domestic cotton 
textile industry began to compete with foreign products. The industry grew rapidly, and by the mid-1920s, 
cotton-spinning exports exceeded imports.  
As the cotton spinning industry expanded, it drew in large numbers of unskilled workers. Real 
wages in cotton textiles increased by more than 50% during the war, remained at those levels after the 
war ended, and then continued an upward trajectory into the 1920s (Liu 1936). Although additional 
industry-level wage data are quite scarce, we were able to obtain figures for real wages for two other key 
exports. Real wages in the silk industry grew by more than 150% during the war and then, after flattening 
out at the conclusion of the war, continued their upward trajectory. Similarly, real wages for coal workers 
(based on Kailun, one of the largest mines in China at that time) grew by more than 25% during the 
1920s.
16 These data suggest that wages were rising in the export sector in response to higher product 
prices.  
Although it is impossible to rule out alternative explanations, the movements in the skill premium 
data seem most consistent with a trade shock rather than either a dramatic rise in the quantity of skilled 
workers in the 1920s or very rapid technological change. The limited data that are available on Chinese 
  18education rates suggest that the expansion of skilled workers due to increased opportunities was small and 
likely came too late in our sample period to account for the observed decline in the skill premium. As 
noted earlier, some technological advances in China appear to have been ongoing in industries like cotton 
textiles, and they tended to raise the demand for unskilled workers rather than displace them. It is 
therefore possible that some of the boost in trade we observe during our sample period is associated with 
technological change in manufacturing, which perhaps resulted from the foreign direct investment into 
China from Japan and other countries at the beginning of the 20
th century. Nevertheless, in cotton textiles 
and other mechanized manufacturing industries in China, the pace of technological change was 
incremental. There were no sudden surges that occurred in the 1910s and 1920s that would be consistent 
with the rather abrupt reversal in the wage premium over these decades. If anything, the pace of 
technological change was slower during the war period due to the difficulty of importing new machinery 
from western countries engaged in combat. The reversal in the upward trend and flattening out of the skill 
premium that occurred during this decade would therefore be inconsistent with technology being the main 
driver. Moreover, in the vast majority of other sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, handicraft 
industries, and mining, there was little technological progress during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.  
 
VI. Model and Simulation  
A. Benchmark model 
To better understand trade’s contribution to the change in the skill premium in the 1910s and 
1920s, we now model a price shock to Chinese exports in a general-equilibrium, factor-endowments 
framework. We then simulate this model using data on the Chinese economy to examine whether our 
empirical findings are plausible and consistent with theory. We first consider a closed economy model as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 We were unable to locate data for real wages in the coal industry prior to 1919 or for other key export industries 
so that we could carry out a more detailed statistical analysis in a panel setting. Recall, the wage data from Yan 
(2008) are occupational and not at the industry level. 
  19a benchmark. In the subsequent subsection, we extend the dynamic model to an open economy subject to 
price shocks.  
Suppose there are two intermediate goods and one final good.
17 Prices of intermediate goods are 
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The production for intermediate good 1 uses unskilled labor, 
1
t L , and land, T , with the shares δ  
and 1 δ −  respectively. Land has a fixed supply, so we normalize the supply of land to be 1. Hence, we 
specify the production function of intermediate good 1 as the following: 
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where 01 δ << . For simplicity, we assume the technology used to produce intermediate good 1,  , is 
constant. Assuming labor markets are perfectly competitive, the wage for unskilled labor will be equal to 
its average product:  
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17 We specify production this way since many developing countries import intermediate goods and export final 
goods. 
  20On the other hand, the production of intermediate good 2 uses both skilled and unskilled labor and is 
specified as a constant returns to scale production function:  
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Since unskilled labor can move freely among all the sectors, wages for unskilled labor will 
equalize across all the sectors of the economy so that  
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We assume that the technology used for the production of intermediate good 1 grows slower than 
that in intermediate good 2. We make this assumption to characterize the fact that the productivity of the 
industrial sector improves rapidly through modernization (perhaps even through the importation of 
foreign technologies). Without losing generality, we simplify the model by assuming that   is constant 
over time, while   grows at a positive rate of
1 A
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  . (11) 
2
1 (1 ) t Ag + =+
2
t A
In our model, there are two types of consumers that optimize over their lifetimes. Consumer i, 
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  21Consumers can borrow and lend at interest rate, r , in any period, which is exogenous to our model. 
Therefore, the budget constraint of consumer i,  {, } H iL ∈ , is:  
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To optimize utility, the consumer thus maximizes equation (12) subject to (13). 
We also assume the total supply of skilled workers is fixed at H and the total supply of unskilled 
labor is fixed at L so that the market-clearing conditions for the labor market are:  
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We define a competitive equilibrium as follows: 
Definition of Competitive Equilibrium: A competitive equilibrium consists of consumption 
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(1) consumption is the solution to the utility maximization problem; 
(2) labor demand and wages satisfy equations (5), (7), (8) and (9); 
(3) labor supply is fixed; 
(4) labor supply and labor demand satisfy equations (14) and (15); 
(5) the law of motion  g  satisfies equation (11); 
(6) the price of intermediate good satisfies equations (2) and (9); 
(7) the price of final good satisfies equation (3); and 
(8) the production of each good satisfies equations (1), (4), and (6). 
 
B. An Open Economy Model with Price Shocks 
  22We now extend the model to describe an open economy with exogenous trade shocks. Trade 
shocks are modeled as exogenous increases in the prices of the final good. Price shocks induce the home 
country to import more intermediate goods from abroad to produce and export more of the final good. To 
relate the open economy version of the model to our empirical analysis of China, we assume the home 
country is abundant in unskilled labor and scarce in skilled labor. Following factor endowment theories, 
we assume the home country therefore has a comparative advantage in producing intermediate good 1 and 
a comparative disadvantage in producing intermediate good 2. It will therefore import intermediate good 
2 in order to raise the production capacity. 
  Based on this framework, the market for the final good can be described by: 
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where 
f
t Y  is domestic consumption of the final good,   is the amount of final good exported,   is 




t IM  is the quantity of  intermediate good 2 imported. 
We assume that the home country is a small economy and is thus a price taker in the market for 
both the final good and intermediate good 2. Therefore, 
f
t p  and   are exogenous and determined by 
global supply and demand. Since we have not modeled the capital account, we assume balance of trade 
for each period so that:  
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C. Analysis and Simulation of the Skill Premium 
We now examine how the skill premium evolves in the two versions of the model. In the 
benchmark closed-economy model, since the total factor productivity (TFP) of intermediate good 2 grows 
over time while the TFP of intermediate good 1 is constant, unskilled labor will migrate out of the 
production of intermediate good 1 and into the production of intermediate good 2 until the asymptotic 
steady state is reached. As described by equation (10), the skill premium will therefore rise until it 
  23becomes flat after reaching the asymptotic steady state. If we conceptualize intermediate good 1 as 
describing production in the agricultural sector, and intermediate good 2 as describing the industrial 
sector, the benchmark model describes the rising skill premium that is typically associated with 
industrialization and faster TFP growth in the industrial sector.  
In the open economy model, the skill premium evolves differently. A persistent increase in the 
price of the final good induces the home country to produce and export more of the final good, using 
intermediate goods produced domestically (by both skilled and unskilled labor) as well as some that are 
imported from abroad. Since the home country has a comparative advantage in producing intermediate 
good 1, it will import intermediate good 2. In contrast to the benchmark model, the open economy model 
will slow down the migration of unskilled labor from intermediate good 1 to intermediate good 2 since 
unskilled labor is needed in order to produce more of the final good for the global market. If the price 
shocks are sufficiently large and persistent, unskilled labor will move back into the production of 
intermediate good 1, thus driving down the home country’s skill premium. The production of intermediate 
good 2 in the home country shrinks, and the home country imports intermediate good 2 to produce the 
final good. 
We can show this by solving the close form of the model. Equation (11) shows that the skill 
premium depends solely on 
2
t L , the amount of unskilled labor used in producing intermediate good 2. 
Hence, we need to solve the relationship between price shocks and unskilled employment in the sector of 
intermediate good 2.  
Assuming profit maximization and the production function for the final good shown in equation 















Plugging this back to equation (16), we have  
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  24Given equation (10), the unskilled wages in two sectors are equal. This yields 
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Again, we set the second intermediate good as a numeraire and hence normalize 
2
t p  to be 1. Equation 
(19) shows that the price of intermediate good 1, 
1
t p , will increase as the price of the final good, 
f
t p , 
rises. Equation (20) shows that, as long as 
1
t p   rises faster than ,    will increase and   will 
decrease so that the equation holds. In other words, the increase in the price of intermediate good 1 tends 
to attract unskilled workers to move back into the production of intermediate good 1, and by equation (10), 







We simulate our general equilibrium model using computational methods so that we can consider 
the effects of the exogenous price shock of World War I on Chinese exports and the skill premium. We 
use parameters from the existing literature and the actual data on the prices of Chinese trade to conduct a 
simulation. The values and sources of parameters are shown in Table 5. We also feed the actual price 
indices of Chinese imports and exports from 1914 to 1928 into our simulation.  
Figure 17 shows that the simulation produces a flattening out and decline in the skill premium, 
the same general shape as observed in the actual data. The decline in the skill premium is somewhat more 
pronounced in the simulation than in the actual data (roughly 11% versus 8%), but the change in the slope 
is consistent with what the observed Chinese data. There are several reasons why the model produces a 
sharper decline in the skill premium than the actual data. First, the model assumes a finite horizon, with 
the shock ending in 1928, while in the real world, agents maximize utilities over a much longer horizon. 
Second, the model also assumes balanced trade for each year in the model whereas China’s actual trade 
was unbalanced. Third, physical capital accumulation and other dynamic mechanisms, not included in the 
model, also affect the skill premium in the real world. Despite the differences in the magnitudes of 
decline, the model successfully shows that price shocks to exports are capable of driving down the skill 
premium, a prediction consistent with factor endowment theories of trade.  
 
  25VII. Conclusion  
Our findings suggest that the opening of China to trade during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century and the shock of World War I led to a dramatic expansion in exports. Prices of exports, 
especially those for unskilled goods, grew rapidly, particularly after 1913. The price shocks to exports and 
rising foreign demand for Chinese goods led to greater specialization and increased production of 
unskilled-intensive products. Unskilled-intensive exports, already dominant in Chinese trade, increased 
their share of total trade over these decades.  
Although we cannot completely rule out alternative explanations, the evidence on factor content 
of trade and unit values suggests that the rapid expansion in exports from Chinese trade significantly 
altered the skill premium in China. It appears that once export prices began to rise dramatically during the 
second decade of the trade boom, wages of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers changed 
sufficiently to alter the slope of the skill premium. By the 1920s, the skill premium had reversed course 
and declined by roughly 8 percent.  
The large and exogenous upward movement in export prices that coincided in with World War I 
suggests that the causality likely runs from trade to wages. Our simulation of an open economy model 
provides further confirmation that a price shock such as World War I can produce the observed 
movements in exports and the skill premium. What is particularly interesting about the data is that 
China’s exports continue to grow long after the war ends, suggesting that as China increasingly produced 
and marketed goods for export, it may have benefited from learning and dynamic economies of scale. In 
this case, then temporary shocks like World War I, can have lasting consequences on trade flows 
(Krugman, 1987).  
Our findings suggest that, in a world when trade was dominated by the movement of relatively 
homogenous goods across borders, trade may have had a considerable impact on wages. The declining 
wage inequality in China during the second two decades of the twentieth century stands in contrast to 
studies examining the recent period of globalization, which emphasize how trade and globalization has 
widened skill premiums in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). The growth in Chinese 
  26exports during the first three decades of the twentieth century was centered on products that used 
unskilled labor intensively. We have suggested that this earlier era of globalization was less influenced by 
trade in intermediate inputs (i.e., outsourcing), increases in capital flows, and complementarity of capital 
with skilled labor – factors that have played a role in widening skill premiums today in developing 
countries.
18  However, as emphasized in the research on the current period of globalization, we 
acknowledge that our findings pertain only to China and may not generalize to other developing countries 
even during our sample period, since countries experienced globalization in different ways and at 
different times.  
                                                           
18 The observed decline in the skill premium in China also seems inconsistent with Melitz-type models of “firm 
upgrading” in that these predict a higher demand for skilled workers as trade openness occurs; this suggests that 
these models may be less well suited for explaining trade-induced movements in the skill premium during the first 
era of globalization.  
  27Appendix:  Data on the Skill Premium 
 
Yan (2008) constructs detailed estimates of real wages and the skill premium for China between 
1858 and 1936. Nominal wages are collected from the records of employees in the CMC for nearly fifty 
Chinese cities, and the wage series are estimated from these records using the Hedonic regression method. 
The author also constructs group-specific cost of living indices from price data and household budget 
information contained in CMC trade statistics and surveys. The resulting nominal wage series and cost of 
living indices make it possible to estimate long-run trends in real wages and skill premia for three basic 
categories of Chinese workers: unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled. 44,600 wage observations are 
collected from CMC archives. Roughly half of the archives pertain to labor, which include surveys of 
local wages and standards of living, CMC wage scales, and most importantly, the Service Lists – that is, 
the individual personnel records of CMC employees. In each year the Service Lists recorded each 
employee’s name, home town, year of joining the service, year of being promoted, year transfer to the 
current customhouse, rank, and monthly salary. 
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  32Table 1. Leading Chinese Exports, by Product, 1903-1928 
 
Units: thousand piculs (for coal: thousand tons) 
 
Year  Raw Cotton  Tea  Ground nut  Bristle  Cotton yarn 
1903  760 1678 157  40   
1914  675 1496 592  51  4 
1919 1072  690  137  52  67 
1928 1112  926  933  67  350 
       
Year  Coal  Bean cake  Wheat Flour  Raw silk  Vegetable Oil
1903  76 3404    211 421 
1914  2006  10769 70  226 1304 
1919 1477  20725  2694  346  4199 
1928  3885  21352 86  435 2368 
 
 



















  33Table 2. Ranking of Industries by Educational Attainment 
IND1950 Industry  Fraction of Skilled 
Employees 
377  Aircraft and parts  0.72 
459  Printing, publishing, and allied industries  0.68 
357  Office and store machines  0.64 
386 Professional  equipment  0.62 
367  Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies  0.62 
476 Petroleum  refining  0.59 
468  Paints, varnishes, and related products  0.58 
458  Misc paper and pulp products  0.57 
407 Dairy  products  0.57 
346  Fabricated steel products  0.55 
478 Rubber  products  0.54 
226  Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction  0.54 
466 Synthetic  fibers  0.54 
358 Misc  machinery  0.54 
469  Misc chemicals and allied products  0.53 
356 Agricultural  machinery and tractors  0.53 
418 Beverage  industries  0.52 
388  Watches, clocks, and clockwork-operated devices  0.52 
409 Grain-mill  products  0.51 
416 Bakery  products  0.51 
449  Misc fabricated textile products  0.49 
376  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment  0.49 
316  Glass and glass products  0.48 
338  Primary nonferrous industries  0.48 
436 Knitting  mills  0.48 
457  Paperboard containers and boxes  0.47 
426  Not specified food industries  0.47 
456  Pulp, paper, and paper-board mills  0.47 
417  Confectionary and related products  0.47 
406 Meat  products  0.46 
 
Note: Traded goods were classified into industries using the IND1950 described in the text. Educational attainment 
is derived using 1940 US census. Please see the text for details. 





489  Leather products, except footwear  0.46 
378  Ship and boat building and repairing  0.45 
487  Leather: tanned, curried, and finished  0.45 
337  Other primary iron and steel industries  0.44 
477  Misc petroleum and coal products  0.44 
379  Railroad and misc transportation equipment  0.44 
488  Footwear, except rubber  0.43 
326  Misc nonmetallic mineral and stone products  0.43 
408  Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and seafood  0.43 
319  Pottery and related prods  0.43 
446  Misc textile mill products  0.42 
437  Dyeing and finishing textiles, except knit goods  0.42 
308 Misc  wood  products  0.42 
309  Furniture and fixtures  0.42 
348  Not specified metal industries  0.41 
206 Metal  mining  0.41 
336  Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills  0.4 
317  Cement, concrete, gypsum and plaster products  0.4 
448  Apparel and accessories  0.39 
116 Forestry  0.37 
438  Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings  0.35 
318 Structural  clay  products  0.33 
439  Yarn, thread, and fabric  0.32 
246 Construction  0.31 
429 Tobacco  manufactures  0.3 
307  Sawmills, planting mills, and mill work  0.28 
236  Nonmetallic  mining and quarrying, except fuel  0.27 
126 Fisheries  0.26 
105 Agriculture  0.22 
306 Logging  0.22 
216 Coal  mining  0.2 
 
  35Table 3. Ranking of Industries by Log Wages 
IND1950 Industry  Log  Wage 
476  Petroleum refining  3.207 
226  Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction  3.127 
468  Paints, varnishes, and related products  3.126 
378  Ship and boat building and repairing  3.124 
459  Printing, publishing, and allied industries  3.124 
357  Office and store machines  3.122 
358  Misc machinery  3.109 
418  Beverage industries  3.1 
469  Misc chemicals and allied products  3.099 
376  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment  3.098 
367  Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies  3.095 
386  Professional equipment  3.092 
478  Rubber products  3.092 
336  Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills  3.091 
356  Agricultural machinery and tractors  3.078 
346  Fabricated steel products  3.075 
406  Meat products  3.07 
377  Aircraft and parts  3.067 
407  Dairy products  3.06 
337  Other primary iron and steel industries  3.055 
338  Primary nonferrous industries  3.055 
456  Pulp, paper, and paper-board mills  3.048 
316  Glass and glass products  3.047 
348  Not specified metal industries  3.045 
317  Cement, concrete, gypsum and plaster products  3.036 
416  Bakery products  3.032 
426  Not specified food industries  3.031 
379  Railroad and misc transportation equipment  3.03 
487  Leather: tanned, curried, and finished  3.028 
326  Misc nonmetallic mineral and stone products  3.024 
466  Synthetic fibers  3.023 
388  Watches, clocks, and clockwork-operated devices  3.02 
 
Note: Traded goods were classified into industries using the IND1950 described in the text. Log wage is derived 
using 1940 US census. Please see the text for details. 
  36Table 3. Ranking of Industries by Log Wages (continued) 
 
IND1950 Industry Log  Wage 
477  Misc petroleum and coal products  3.017 
409  Grain-mill products  3.011 
458  Misc paper and pulp products  3.007 
206  Metal mining  3.006 
319  Pottery and related products  2.986 
446  Misc textile mill products  2.984 
438  Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings  2.973 
318  Structural clay products  2.954 
457  Paperboard containers and boxes  2.953 
309  Furniture and fixtures  2.943 
437  Dyeing and finishing textiles, except knit goods  2.937 
308  Misc wood products  2.931 
489  Leather products, except footwear  2.913 
417  Confectionary and related products  2.905 
216  Coal mining  2.9 
436  Knitting mills  2.897 
488  Footwear, except rubber  2.886 
429  Tobacco manufactures  2.865 
236  Nonmetallic  mining and quarrying, except fuel  2.85 
439  Yarn, thread, and fabric  2.847 
408  Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and seafood  2.827 
307  Sawmills, planting mills, and mill work  2.815 
448  Apparel and accessories  2.812 
246  Construction  2.796 
449  Misc fabricated textile products  2.79 
306  Logging  2.703 
116  Forestry  2.682 
126  Fisheries  2.666 
105  Agriculture  2.095 
 
  37Table 4. Ranking of Industries by the 1928 Shanghai Survey 
 
Industry Code  Industry Name  Capital-Labor Ratio 
Unit: Chinese Yuan per worker 
93  Electric and water works  10628.86 
46 Condiments  5169.01 
26 Medicine  4356.16 
47  Cigars and cigarettes  4298.39 
71 Metal  products  3746.26 
27  Manufacture of paper  3118.92 
31  Manufacture of varnish  2099.24 
29 Manufacture  of  enameled ware  2009.51 
73  Musical instruments and toys  1810.9 
28 Match  making  1668.87 
91 Building  material  1582.64 
25 Glassware  1342.49 
63 Founding  1163.01 
86 Clothing  1142.16 
92 Coal  briquettes  1140.46 
23 Cosmetics  977.14 
74 Scientific  apparatus  955.95 
41 Wheat  flour  mills  900.91 
43 Oil  mills  881.55 
45 Frozen  egg  products  782.83 
32 Other  chemical  739.37 
51 Printing  727.67 
81 Hats  722.83 
75  Other tools and instruments  641.51 
21  Dyeing and printing of textiles  618.92 
48  Candies and canned food  598 




Note: Traded goods were classified into industries using the 1928 Shanghai survey data described in the text. 
Capital-labor ratio is derived using this survey too. Please see the text for details. 
  38Table 4. Ranking of Industries by the 1928 Shanghai Survey (continued) 
Industry Code  Industry Name  Capital-Labor Ratio 
16 Knitted  goods  488.5 
17 Other  textile  477.26 
62 Manufacture  of  electrical instruments  396.32 
94  Trimmings and ribbons  387.11 
82 Umbrellas  379.27 
11 Cotton  spinning  357.99 
97  Other miscellaneous industries  344.68 
83 Brushes  325.1 
84 Writing  outfit  294.87 
12 Cotton  weaving  277.37 
15 Wool  weaving  258.09 
22 Leather  manufacturing  241.06 
64 Shipbuilding  240.55 
14 Silk  weaving  204.25 
96 Cotton  ginning  203.19 
85 Spectacles  188.54 
72  Wooden, rattan, and bamboo articles  146.68 
44  Soda water and other soft drinks  129.78 
24  Soap and candles  127.62 
87 Other  daily  necessities  114.09 
61  Manufacture and repairing of machines  81.27 
42 Rice  mills  59.77 
13 Silk  reeling  47.69 
















δ   0.6 
1 A 0.22 






Sources of Parameters: 
1.  We set the value of γ arbitrarily to equal 0.5, which means the two intermediate goods are equally important in 
production. Results do not appear sensitive to other values. 
2.  ε : Burstein and Vogel (2009).  
3.  α , and δ : Doepke (2004) . 
4. 
1 A  and
2 A : Acemoglu and Zilibiotti (2001).  












  40Figure 1. The Value of China’s Foreign Trade 
Panel A: Nominal value of trade                                                                        
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Figure 3. Quantities of Foreign Imports and Exports of Cotton Yarn, 1910-1935 
 










Source: Hsiao (1974) 
  42Figure 4. Unskilled Export and Import Shares, 1903-1928 
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from the 1940 US census. See the text for a description of the 
educational attainment and average wages. 
  43Figure 5. Skilled Export and Import Shares, 1903-1928 
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Notes: Authors’ calculations are based on data from US 1940 census. See the text for the description of educational 
attainment and average wages. 
  44Figure 6. Value of Exports and Imports by Skill Intensity, 1903 
 
Panel A: classified by educational attainment                                                      
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Panel B: classified by log wage                                                                            
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Numbers on individual bars correspond to industry codes listed 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
  45Figure 7. Value of Exports and Imports by Skill Intensity, 1913 
 
Panel A: classified by educational attainment                                                      
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Panel B: classified by log wage                                                                            
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Numbers on individual bars correspond to industry codes listed 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
  46Figure 8. Value of Exports and Imports by Skill Intensity, 1919 
Panel A: classified by educational attainment                                                      
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Panel B: classified by log wage                                                                            
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Numbers on individual bars correspond to industry codes listed 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
  47Figure 9. Value of Exports and Imports by Skill Intensity, 1928 
Panel A: classified by educational attainment                                                      
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Panel B: classified by log wage 
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Numbers on individual bars correspond to industry codes listed 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
  48Figure 10. Skill Intensity and the Growth Rate of Exports from 1903 to 1928 
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Skill intensity based on data from the 1940 US census. 
 
  49Figure 11. Skill Intensity and the Growth Rate of Imports from 1903 to 1928 
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Skill intensity based on data from the 1940 US census. 
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Source: Authors’ calculation as described in the text. Skill intensity based on data from the 1928 Shanghai Survey 
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  52Figure 15. Annual Percentage Growth Rates for Prices of Major Export Commodities 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the CMC’s annual trade publications 
  53Figure 16. Export Price of Cotton Yarn 
















1913 1916 1919 1922 1925 1928
 
Source: CMC annual trade publications. 













1903 1906 1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927
actual skill premium simulated skill premium
 
  54